The Federal Circuit: A Model
for Reform?
Paul D. Carrington* and Paulina Orchard**
Are our federal courts organized suitably to perform their mission of assuring coherent administration of our national law? Maybe
not. The senior author of this Article, along with many others, argued
to the contrary forty years ago.1 Now, experience with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit tends to confirm that
an alternative structure of the federal judiciary could better serve the
need for coherent national law, and without serious adverse consequences. Perhaps, therefore, it is now time for Congress to reconsider
the matter. We here suggest the possibility that the United States replicate the structure of the appellate courts of the Federal Republic of
Germany, which, like the Federal Circuit, are specialized to assure coherent and consistent interpretation of that nation’s laws.2 Advances
in technology have greatly reduced the need for the traditional regionalization of the federal appellate process,3 so that the model supplied
by the Federal Circuit may offer new hope that our national law could
be administered with substantially greater coherence and efficiency
than the present system of conflicted circuits allows.
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1 AM. BAR FOUND., ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
APPEALS (1968) (Carrington served as director of this study.); Comm’n on Revision of the
Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67
F.R.D. 195, 204–08 (1975); Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, Report, 57
F.R.D. 573, 577–84 (1972) (prepared for the Federal Judicial Center); see also FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (1993);
Comm’n on Structural Alternatives for the Fed. Courts of Appeals, Final Report (1998), available at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/app_comm_uscourts_gov.html (discussing the way in
which courts of appeals can adapt to this new environment).
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2 See generally Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Subject Matter Organization: The German
Design from an American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (1981).
3 See Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan’s Celestial City,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1535–36 (1998).
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Origins of the Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit was established through the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 19824 as a partial response to fifteen years of
agitation over the structure of the federal judiciary.5 Much of the preexisting concern pertained to the instability of the national law. The
Supreme Court had largely disowned responsibility for resolving conflicts in the interpretation of patent law.6 The regional courts of appeals were clearly not organized to perform that task; for them, the
issue remained a matter of concern.7
In 1965, the American Bar Foundation commissioned a study that
concluded that there was a need for more effective harmonization of
intermediate-court decisions.8 A contemporaneous study commissioned by the Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion that more
centralization of the federal judicial power was in order.9 Soon thereafter the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted a third study coming
to a similar conclusion.10 But nothing was done, apparently because
the requisite political energy was lacking. Advocates of reform were
left to meditate on the utterance of Arthur Vanderbilt that “judicial
reform is no sport for the short-winded.”11
In 1976, the senior author of this Article and others suggested the
division of the jurisdictions of federal appellate courts according to
subject-matter categories.12 Despite the benefits of subject-matter adjudication, such as the ability to better accommodate docket growth,
those authors cautioned against a strictly specialized court with speFederal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
See, e.g., AM. BAR FOUND., supra note 1; Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System, supra note 1, at 204–08 (discussing the burdens on the courts of appeals
caused by increased litigation and intercircuit jurisprudential conflict); Study Group on the
Caseload of the Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 577–84 (discussing how the increasing workload
of the Supreme Court was compromising the Court’s ability to achieve its essential functions).
6 See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 155 (1973) (finding it unsurprising that the Court had failed to resolve a significant circuit split over a patent law
issue); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (“[I]t must be remembered that
the primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material lies in the Patent Office.”).
7 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 1, at 13; Comm’n on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals, supra note 1.
8 See AM. BAR FOUND., supra note 1.
9 See Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 577–84.
4
5

10 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 1, at 105–21 (examining various proposals without
questioning the need for increased centralization).
11 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF JUDICIAL COUNCILS, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, at xix (Arthur T. Vanderbilt ed., 1949).
12 PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 167–84 (1976).
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cialized judges.13 While they acknowledged that “[p]erhaps too much
is made of these feared disadvantages,” specialized courts are more
likely to be vulnerable to political manipulation of the process by
which the judges are selected, and their judges more likely to “lose
sight of the basic values at stake in their decisions.”14 Contemplating
a special patent court, they expressed concern about the potential for
capture by powerful research and development interests.15 Judge
Henry J. Friendly, in reflecting on a future patent court, argued that
rather than special interests exerting undue influence, the court would
likely be dominated by a particular attitude on the patent law.16
Despite this combination of enthusiasm and caution regarding
specialized jurisdiction, the Justice Department of President Carter,
led by Attorney General Griffin Bell and Assistant Attorney General
Daniel Meador, crafted the design of the Federal Circuit. This was in
part a response to the concerns favoring the restructuring of the courts
of appeals.17 The economic pressures of the 1970s also encouraged
special attention to addressing the problems particular to the patent
law.18 The reformers achieved a consolidation of the two specialized
national courts responsible for hearing appeals from the Court of International Trade and the Court of Claims. The new court would
serve to centralize appeals in intellectual property cases. It had a
predecessor of sorts in the Emergency Court of Appeals that had been
established in 1942 to centralize appeals in cases arising under wartime price- and wage-control laws that absolutely required national
uniformity.19
The new Federal Circuit was in part a response to a shared sense
that the consequences of conflicting interpretations of federal law
were similarly unhelpful when the subject was an issue of the law of
See id. at 168.
Id. at 168–69.
15 Id. at 220.
16 Cf. FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 159 (“[A] specialized court having exclusive jurisdiction
over patent litigation might be overly liberal or unduly strict in its attitude toward patents—
more likely the former.”).
17 Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the Federal Circuit: A Personal Account, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
581, 582–88 (1992).
18 The Honorable Pauline Newman, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed.
Circuit, Remarks at The Federal Circuit: The National Appellate Court Celebration and Introspective Symposium (Mar. 18, 2009) (on file with authors).
19 Transcript of Proceedings at the Final Session of the Court, United States Court of Appeals, 299 F.2d 1, 2–3 (1961). The scheme was used again for the Emergency Court of Appeals
when wage and price controls were reestablished in 1971. See Economic Stabilization Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 92-210, §§ 202, 211(b), 85 Stat. 743, 744, 749 (1971).
13
14
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patents. Special concern about the administration of patent law had
been expressed as early as the eighteenth century.20 Patent law was
identified early as an area that would be best served by more uniformity and predictability through centralized adjudication.21 Patent law
was plagued by vague and ambiguous statutory language that provided little guidance for judges and juries.22 This incoherence became
an increasingly acute problem as rails were laid in the nineteenth century and the national economy emerged.
When and where might those investing in patents be confident
that their rights would be enforced? Conflicting regional, political,
and industry-based interests often led to divergent outcomes among
different courts. Until the creation of the Federal Circuit, only thirtyfive percent of patents survived a challenge of their validity.23 For example, in the nineteenth century the interests of Southern planters
made it nearly impossible for Eli Whitney to protect his cotton gin
invention in Georgia, where the jurymen allegedly “[came] to an understanding among themselves, that they [would] never give a verdict
in [Whitney’s] favor” regardless of the merits of the case.24 And farmers of the Upper Midwest sitting on juries might be damned rather
than enforce any patent; their bias was aroused by the threat of patent
claims on the prices they paid for windmills or barbed wire. Reportedly, “it was quite clear that there was no such thing as a valid patent
in the Eighth Circuit, and the climate in the Ninth Circuit was not
much more hospitable. In the Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, patent infringement could get a client into big trouble.”25
This lack of uniform treatment of patents among the federal circuits both diminished the value of patents and threatened the fundamental goals of the patent law—namely, encouragement of innovation
and economic growth. And the Supreme Court had quite clearly dis20 See generally Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice & Interest
Groups in the Development of American Patent Law: 1790–1870 (Ill. Law & Econ. Research
Papers Series, Research Paper No. LE07-007, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?
abstract_id=1262970.
21

FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 178

(1928).
22 For example, the 1793 Act’s requirement that inventors “distinguish” an invention
“from all other things before known.” Id. at 9.
23

WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
PROPERTY LAW 334 (2003).
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Morriss & Nard, supra note 20, at 45.

Robert L. Harmon, Seven New Rules of Thumb: How the Federal Circuit Has Changed
the Way Patent Lawyers Advise Clients, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 573, 574 (1992).
25
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owned responsibility to resolve conflicting laws of the circuit, even issues of patent law.
On the other hand, there was widely shared concern at the time
the Federal Circuit was established that a specialized court would attract the unwelcome political attention of special interests.26 That
concern was derived in part from experience with the Commerce
Court that had been established to review cases involving federal regulation of the railroads by the Interstate Commerce Commission.27 It
was widely believed that the Commerce Court was heavily biased in
favor of the railroads.28 On that account, the Commerce Court was
abolished only a few years after it was established.29 Based on that
experience, there was concern that those most invested in the law of
intellectual property, including the law of patents, would succeed in
gaining control of the process by which the judges sitting on the Federal Circuit would be selected.30
There was also a concern expressed that specialization would produce a narrow mindset among judges whose duties were narrowly
confined. In a 1951 essay, Judge Simon Rifkind argued that “[t]he
patent law does not live in the seclusion and silence of a Trappist
monastery. It is part and parcel of the whole body of our law. It ministers to a system of monopolies within a larger competitive system.”31
This view suggested a risk that judges devoting their careers to the law
of patents would fail to consider how their interpretations of the law
affect innovation and broader economic and social interests.
Despite these concerns, the Federal Circuit was established in
1982.32
Assessing the Experience
As many commentators have noted, the Federal Circuit is not a
specialized court in the narrowest sense—judges come from diverse
26 Cf. Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
1003 (1991).
27 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 21, at 162–74.
28 George E. Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study of Institutional Weakness, 8
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 238, 243 (1964).
29 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 21, at 162, 166–68.
30 Cf. Thomas E. Baker, Imagining the Alternative Futures of the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
28 GA. L. REV. 913, 950 (1994) (outlining the perceived danger that a specialized court can be
“captured” by an invested party and citing the Commerce Court as a primary example).
31 Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425, 425 (1951).
32 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
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backgrounds and may sit by designation, and the court often reviews
non-patent-based claims as well.33 Patent cases make up only twentyfive to thirty percent of the court’s docket.34 Therefore, judges are not
confined to patent cases day after day, but patent law is able to benefit
from uniform treatment.
Contrary to the fears at the time of its creation, the Federal Circuit has not openly manifested a bias in favor of expanding intellectual
property rights. While it is difficult to establish conclusively with empirical evidence,35 it is possible that the judges of the Federal Circuit
have been especially attentive to the language of controlling legal
texts, and especially disinclined to openly express their political preferences. Concerns raised in the 1970s may have encouraged formalistic adherence to precedent in an effort to dispel any appearance of
impropriety.36 Numerous legal scholars have found the Federal Circuit’s decisions to be overly formalistic.37 Former Chief Judge Michel
stressed that “we really do not have an agenda; actually it would be
very difficult and undesirable to have an agenda.”38 Unlike other federal appellate courts, which do not have to contend with the legacy of
the Commerce Court, Federal Circuit judges seem to be “straining to
persuade the public that they are not voting their preferences.”39
The special role of the court as a source of stability in the law of
patents is also manifested in its availability to respond to patent law
questions certified to it by the regional circuits. The court at first de33 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in
Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 793–96 (2004); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In
Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787,
820 (2008) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity]; Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 603, 611–14 (1989); Andrew P. Morriss, A Public Choice Perspective on the Federal Circuit,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 811, 816 (2004); Randall R. Rader, supra note 26, at 1006–09.
34 Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 553 (2003).
35 See generally Hon. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical
Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J.
1895 (2009).
36 Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity, supra note 33, at 815; see also Pauline Newman, The
Sixth Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture: Commentary on the Paper by Professor Dreyfuss, 61
BROOK. L. REV. 53, 55–56 (1995) (noting the growing concern over the inconsistency of patent
adjudication among the regional circuits).
37 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity, supra note 33, at 809; Craig Allen Nard & John
F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1644 (2007);
Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1103–04 (2003).
38 Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity, supra note 33, at 818.
39 Id.
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nied its authority to answer questions certified under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b),40 only to have Congress promptly amend the statute to provide the jurisdiction.41 Such questions may also be certified by district
courts pursuant to Rule 54(b).42
Somewhat contrary concern has also been raised about the Federal Circuit’s ability to create law that is both “accurate and of high
quality.”43 The court’s preoccupation with the formalities of intellectual property law for which it has special responsibility may be in part
a consequence of the court’s engagement with a specialized bar.
Some have argued that the court’s formalistic approach to the law it
interprets is best attributed to the “closed cycle” between the court
and patent attorneys.44 Chief Judge Michel has acknowledged that a
combination of the centralized forum and a specialized bar has created a situation in which the Federal Circuit is often merely “talking
to itself”—a cycle of briefs echoing past decisions and the court basing
its holdings on those briefs.45
It is perhaps relevant to that concern that neither the Patent and
Trademark Office nor the district courts are particularly well equipped
to consider the political or economic consequences of patent law decisions, or to cause the Federal Circuit reviewing their actions to do so.46
The Federal Circuit reverses district court decisions at a high rate,
placing no greater weight on the decisions made by those district
courts with greater patent law fact-finding experience.47 That fact
might be taken to indicate its shared confidence in the interpretations
of patent law expressed in its published opinions.
It is possible that beneath the surface commitment of legal formalism, the Federal Circuit may, as early critics of the idea feared,
have fostered a greater emphasis on law protecting patents to the detriment of competition and technological development.48 Empirical
studies have shown significant economic costs associated with the
prevalence of “low quality” patents for marginal improvements and
40

See Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 709 F.2d 710, 710–11 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

41

See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c) (2006).

See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS
1264–68 (9th ed. 2009).
42

43

Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity, supra note 33, at 796.

44

See Nard & Duffy, supra note 37, at 1622.

45

Id.

46

Rai, supra note 37, at 1036–39.

47

Id. at 1090–91, 1097–98.

48

See Dreyfuss, Institutional Identity, supra note 33, at 788.
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the need to acquire and litigate defensive patents.49 Furthermore,
there is a detriment to the objective of furthering scientific progress by
discouraging entrants into the marketplace.50 The Federal Trade
Commission has raised these and other concerns, arguing that these
“thickets of rights” impose significant burdens on society both financially and in terms of innovation policy.51 The court may, in short, be
“perilously close to breaking technology with law.”52
While the Federal Circuit has seen both a number of significant
successes and failures in the adjudication of patent cases and the development of the patent law, the experiment with the centralized adjudication of patents demonstrates an important point. Although we
may be unable to completely eliminate all negative effects of centralization, such as doctrinal isolation and tunnel vision, these effects can
be limited to make centralized adjudication a potentially viable alternative to the traditional regional model in many cases.
A Model To Be Replicated?
The story of the court’s development thus reopens the question
regarding the possible achievement of greater stability and reduction
of internal conflict in other fields of national law. Although many of
the challenges and benefits of adjudicating patent law in the centralized forum of the Federal Circuit are unique to that area of law, the
court has provided meaningful insight into specialized adjudication in
general. The Federal Circuit not only helps to illustrate how modern
social, economic, and legal realities have affected the arguments surrounding specialized courts, but it also demonstrates that it is possible
to make significant changes to federal appellate adjudication in ways
that actively take into account past missteps.
Adjudicating other particular areas of law at the federal appellate
level in one forum rather than in the regional circuit courts ought to
be reconsidered for two reasons. First, the size of the dockets of both
the appellate courts and the Supreme Court and the prevalence of
unresolved circuit splits53 call for renewed efforts to increase efficiency
and to reduce uncertainty and the resulting forum-shopping among
49
50
51
52

Id. at 794.
Id.
Id. at 789.
JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING

THE

COMMONS

OF THE

MIND 161

(2008).
53

at 18.

For a recent assessment, see Gregory P. Joseph, Circuit Splits, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 13, 2009,
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parties involved in federal litigation.54 Second, specific areas of the
law, other than patent law, could benefit substantially from greater
uniformity, predictability, and judges with greater familiarity with related complex issues.55
Those content with the present structure of the federal courts
tend to find comfort in the notion that prolonged and many-sided circuit conflicts will ultimately result in the best possible resolution of
uncertainties in the national law. “Percolation” is the term used to
describe this vision.56 Someday, it is thought, any truly troubling issues will be resolved by a Supreme Court informed by the collective
wisdom of many circuit court opinions. However, as Dan Meador has
observed, “it seems more important that the matter be settled than
that it be settled ‘right,’” particularly because what is “right” is ultimately up to Congress.57 “[T]he lack of any point of authoritative determination” short of the Supreme Court for questions of statutory
interpretation was noted by Judge Friendly as one of the most significant problems facing the regional circuit design.58 To take a homely
example, how many lower federal courts should have to face the open
question of whether food stamps can be used at fast-food restaurants?59 Given the clumsiness of the bicameral legislative process saturated with campaign contributions, it is not reasonable to expect
Congress to thoughtfully address an enormous range of issues of similar gravity. But the frailties of the legislative process do not excuse a
legal system leaving an infinite number and range of issues of statutory interpretation to “percolate.” Either food stamps can be so used
or they cannot, and leaving such issues to diverse regionalized resolution calls into question the seriousness of the commitment to the rule
of law.
Not only is percolation of limited value for questions of federal
law, but the negative effects of the lack of uniformity and predictability are most noticeable in areas of law governed by federal statutes.
The types of cases most commonly recommended for centralized adjudication include those involving federal agencies and law. Immigra54 Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution Through Subject Matter
Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 471, 484–85 (1983).
55 Meador, Challenge, supra note 33, at 621–24.
56 Id. at 633–34.
57 Id.
58 FRIENDLY, supra note 6, at 161–62.
59 Cf. Paul D. Carrington, United States Appeals in Civil Cases: A Field and Statistical
Analysis, 11 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1108 (1974) (listing this as an issue “[a]ppealable to Courts of
Appeals”).
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tion, internal revenue, telecommunications, and antitrust have all
been cited as areas of the law where the benefits of uniformity, efficiency, and predictability far outweigh those of percolation or regional
treatment.60 As discussion about the need to incorporate competition
policy analysis into patent decisions suggests, centralization of further
areas of federal law would provide unique opportunities to prevent
some of the downfalls associated with specialized courts by combining
subject matter in a way that maintains diversity of the court’s docket
while encouraging judges to avoid doctrinal isolation.61
Moreover, the benefits of regionalizing the federal appellate process have steadily diminished. As the number of judges has increased,
the size of dockets has enlarged, and law clerks and central staff have
taken over many of the lesser tasks, the process is very different from
what it was as recently as the late 1960s.62 Oral argument is no longer
a common feature of the federal appellate process.63 Neither is the
published opinion of the court.64 The process is, in these respects, losing the transparency that is an important means of gaining public
trust.65
This loss of transparency in federal appellate courts is associated
with the judges’ frequent preoccupation with making “the law of the
circuit” as expressed in their published opinions.66 But that form of
judge-made law, perhaps inevitably in a universe of nontransparency,
commands limited attention in lower courts or future cases. It is often
merely material for percolation.
This Federal Circuit experience suggests the benefits of a system
directing appeals presenting issues of national law to a specialized forum capable of gaining respect as the authority in its field. Just as
60

Meador, supra note 33, at 621–24.

See Seamon, supra note 34, at 582; see also Meador, supra note 17, at 589, 602.
See Meador, supra note 54, at 471–73.
63 MICHAEL E. TIGAR & JANE B. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE 480–83 (3d ed. 2008) (noting that oral argument was granted in only 40.1% of cases decided
in the courts of appeals in 1997); see also Daniel J. Meador, Toward Orality and Visibility in the
Appellate Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 732, 732–34 (1983) (describing the “Loss of Orality”); cf.
Baker, supra note 30, at 961 (proposing “greater orality” in the courts of appeals).
64 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 529 (2004); Judith Resnik, Courts:
In and out of Sight, Site and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 803–09 (2008).
65 Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S.
Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1483 (2004) (citing Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the
Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766, 768
(1983)).
66 RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 160 (1999).
61
62

2010]

The Federal Circuit: A Model for Reform?

585

Federal Circuit judges sit occasionally on other circuits, so other circuit judges could be assigned to sit on a panel having exclusive appellate jurisdiction over a specified class of cases. Again, the nowforgotten Emergency Court of Appeals provides an additional example and model.67 Its judges were summoned from their regular duty in
the regional courts to sit on a panel having national jurisdiction over a
specified class of appeals.68 Such assignments were not full-time employment; that court’s judges continued to sit on their regional courts.
We note that immigration, internal revenue, telecommunications,
and antitrust have all been cited as areas of the law where the benefits
of uniformity, efficiency, and predictability far outweigh those of percolation or regional treatment.69 In its struggle to take account of
public policy concerns such as innovation in its decisionmaking, the
Federal Circuit has demonstrated the fact that different areas of federal law often require individual attention to ensure that the law is
both precise and accurate.70 The creation of courts having exclusive
nationwide jurisdiction over such classes of appeals could materially
improve the quality and evenhandedness of our national law. We
might even be enabled to pay the same taxes as our fellow citizens in
distant circuits.
We note that modern technology, far advanced since 1979, enables a national court to conduct oral argument and judicial conferences electronically. As most federal appellate courtrooms are now
sparingly used, it should not be difficult to find convenient venues for
occasional conferences and hearings by the panel of judges assigned to
exercise such jurisdiction. We do not presently suggest that circuit
judges sitting part-time on such a court should be appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. We envision that the duty
would be assigned in some reasonably random manner, perhaps designed by the Judicial Conference of the United States.
In these ways, we stop short of a prescription to cure all the
problems. But we celebrate the success of the Federal Circuit in serving as additional evidence that Congress, when well advised, can design and approve structural changes in the federal judiciary that will
better serve the public interest.

See Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23.
See id. § 204(c), 56 Stat. at 32.
69 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
70 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 68–69 (1989).
67
68

